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Abstract
In 2010 and 2011, there has been a fresh wave of interest in cap-
ital controls. India is one of the few large countries with a complex
system of capital controls, and hence oers an opportunity to assess
the extent to which these help achieve goals of macroeconomic and -
nancial policy. We nd that the capital controls were associated with
poor governance, were unable to sustain the erstwhile exchange rate
regime, and did not support nancial stability. India's experience is
thus inconsistent with the revisionist view of capital controls. Macroe-
conomic policy in India has moved away from the erstwhile strategies,
towards greater exchange rate 
exibility combined with capital ac-
count liberalisation.
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21 Introduction
The debate on the eectiveness of capital controls has come alive after an
IMF sta proposal supporting the use of controls by emerging economies fac-
ing large volatile in
ows (Ostry, Ghosh, Habermeier, Chamon, Qureshi, and
Reinhardt, 2010). The impact of controls on the magnitude and composition
of capital 
ows, on frictions in transacting and monetary policy have been a
subject of enormous debate.1 There is however little consensus on the issue.
The empirical experience about the eectiveness of capital controls varies
with initial conditions Magud, Reinhart, and Rogo (2011). To the extent
that there are country specic characteristics that make capital controls ef-
fective, understanding individual country experiences with capital controls
gains signicance.
There has been considerable interest in India's experience, for two reasons.
One is that India has long had an extensive system of administrative controls.
While capital controls may have limited eectiveness in a country that has
removed controls completely and then attempts to reintroduce them in a
limited way, India has a long standing legal and administrative structure in
place that can support imposition or tightening of a comprehensive array of
controls. The well-known Chinn-Ito measure of de jure restrictions attaches
a score for each country for each year from 1970 onwards, ranging from -1.83
(for completely closed) to +2.5 (for completely open). In this dataset, India
stood at -1.13 in 2008, implying that it is much less open than most other
major emerging markets like Brazil, South Korea and Russia, and about
as closed as China. Also, in contrast to market based controls which are
often seen to be eective in the short run (Edwards, 2007), the experience of
countries such as India and China who have administrative controls has not
been studied in the literature (Davies and Drexler, 2010).
The second reason is that India fared relatively well in the global crisis.
As the global economy slowed, so did the Indian economy, with seasonally
adjusted GDP growth dropping from a peak of annualised growth of 11.7
per cent (quarter ended Dec 2005) to 4.0 per cent (quarter ended December
2008), a decline of 7.7 percentage points. While this was a very large drop
by any standard, growth remained positive in the downturn, and no large
1See: DeKaplan and Rodrik (2002); Clements and Kamil (2009); Vieira and Holland
(2003); Edwards (2007); Vithessonthi and Tongurai (2010); Reinhart (2000); Espinoza
(2005); Reinhart and Smith (1998); Binici, Hutchison, and Schindler (2010); Reinhart and
Edison (2001); Tamirisa (2007); Kawai and Takagi (2004); Reinhart and Smith (2002);
Campion and Neumann (2004); Eichengreen (2001); Eichengreen and Leblang (2003);
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006); Forbes (2007); Edison and Warnock (2008)
3nancial rm went bankrupt.
The juxtaposition of extensive controls and a favorable economic performance
has suggested to some that the two were causally linked. It has been argued,
for example, that controls made India more resilient, by isolating it from
shocks that occurred elsewhere, and preventing a build-up of foreign debt.
This paper attempts to subject this claim to careful analysis. Similar to the
analytical framework proposed by Magud, Reinhart, and Rogo (2011) it
attempts to answer a critical question: Did the system of controls actually
work as a tool for macroeconomic policy?
While the structure of controls remained in place, there was a continous,
albeit slow movement towards reducing controls and opening up of the cap-
ital account for a decade starting in 1991. In the period after the Asian
crisis, especially in the years 2001-2004, the Indian economy started attract-
ing larger capital in
ows. The policy of maintaining a low volatility of the
exchange rate of the rupee was implemented through central bank interven-
tion in the foreign exchange market. The Reserve Bank of India sterilised its
intervention.
As has been observed in the international experience, sterilised intervention
tends to increase capital in
ows, especially short-term capital (Montiel and
Reinhart, 1999). India too saw a sharp growth in capital in
ows as expecta-
tions of rupee appreciation added to the higher interest rate dierential and
enhanced the attractiveness of the rupee as an asset (Patnaik, 2005). After
2004, when RBI ran out of its stock of government bonds which it had been
using for sterilisation, the costs of sterilisation became more transparent.
The RBI then shifted to only partial sterilisation. With this, expectations
of appreciation increased, and India witnessed a surge of capital 
ows. After
this, there was a surge of eort at RBI on using capital controls to regain
autonomy of monetary poliy.
As the detailed narrative of the paper suggests, these eorts introduced sub-
stantial microeconomic costs and involved important deciencies of gover-
nance. Even if these costs are disregarded, the performance of the capital
controls system can be broken down into three components:
Magnitude and composition of in
ows The capital controls reduced par-
ticular types of in
ows (such as long-term foreign currency borrowing),
but could not ensure that the overall magnitude of capital in
ows was
small. Indeed, by 2007 overall 
ows had reached 9 percent of GDP {
large not only by historical Indian standards, but also by comparison
with other major emerging markets, most of which had more liberal de
4jure regimes.
Monetary policy regime Despite a series of reinforcing measures, the con-
trols were not tight enough to preserve the monetary policy regime. The
de facto exchange rate peg gave way, in two steps, to a more 
exible
exchange rate regime. On 23 May 2003, there was a structural break
in the exchange rate regime, and for the next four years, rupee-dollar
volatility doubled to 3.9 per cent annualised. This arrangement worked
till 23 March 2007, when there was another structural break and for
the next four years, 
exibility doubled once again to 9.0 per cent an-
nualised. For the most recent 20 months, the rupee has witnessed
negligible intervention: it has been a clean 
oat.
Financial stability The attempt to uphold the exchange rate regime with
capital controls actually eroded nancial stability.
Since the controls proved porous and sterilisation was only partial, the
large scale purchase of dollars spilled over into loose monetary policy.
The largest ever credit boom in India's history came about, with credit
to the private sector growing by around 30 percent year-on-year for
three consecutive years.
India also experienced an asset price boom on the stock market which
was more extreme than that seen with most emerging markets, some
of which had open capital accounts.
The capital controls regime was not successful in preventing rms from
taking on currency exposure. Indeed, to the extent that the capital
controls helped sustain a relatively in
exible exchange rate regime, the
evidence suggests that it encouraged rms to increase their currency
exposure. In contrast, during periods of exchange rate 
exibility, rms
reduced their balance sheet exposure to foreign currencies.
Nor were the capital controls successful in insulating the Indian nan-
cial system from foreign disturbances. To the contrary, the domestic
money market was badly disrupted when Lehman Brothers failed, with
money market rates tripling to more than 15 percent, and mutual funds
suering from large withdrawals, forcing the central bank to inject large
amounts of liquidity to banks and other nancial institutions.
In sum, the evidence suggests that India's capital control system did not de-
liver on the goals of policy makers. Even an unusually extensive set of controls
proved unable to sustain India's macroeconomic and nancial framework at
a time when the economy was integrating rapidly with the rest of the world.
5Indeed, the macroeconomic policy framework in India has evolved in two
directions in recent years. First, as described above, in March 2007 the
exchange rate regime moved towards greater 
exibility, and after April 2009,
currency trading by the central bank has subsided.
Second, policymakers have moved towards liberalisation of capital controls.
A recent Ministry of Finance Working Group report has recommended a se-
ries of reforms. Of particular importance are issues of rule of law, where
certain deciencies were visible in the pre-crisis period, and 
awed policy
positions on issues of nancial stability, such as the bias in the capital con-
trols regime in favour of OTC derivatives (as opposed to exchange-traded
derivatives) and in favour of dollar denominated borrowing (as opposed to
local currency borrowing). In February 2011, the implementation of some of
these proposals commenced.
An overall judgment about capital controls on the global scale cannot, of
course, turn on the experience of one country. However, India stands out
in this debate. Given the complex administrative system of capital controls
that was in place, it was an ideal setting where capital controls could have
worked. Yet, even in India, capital controls failed to deliver the goals of
policy makers.
India is perhaps representative of large middle income countries with a rela-
tively sophisticated private sector and nancial system. The lessons of this
experience may well be inapplicable in the least developed countries.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 oers a brief
description of the Indian capital controls regime. Section 3 explains how this
system was tightened to restrict in
ows. Section 4 examines the empirical
evidence on the extent to which the Indian capital controls regime achieved
the goals of macroeconomic and nancial policy. Section 5 looks forward,
outlining the thinking of the Indian authorities on reforms of the capital
controls regime. Finally, Section 6 concludes and identies areas for further
work.
62 An elaborate administrative system of cap-
ital controls
2.1 International comparison
During colonial rule, India had full convertibility. Capital controls were rst
introduced by the British in 1942, and the complex administrative arrange-
ments steadily grew through the years. Since the 1980s, the country has
gradually opened up to the outside world, but a wholesale abolition of capi-
tal controls, or a shift to full capital account liberalisation, has not been un-
dertaken. Instead, highly limited mechanisms for cross-border nance have
been brought into place, with strong government involvement in terms of
permissions, quotas, and prescriptive rules.
India's policy makers believed that large capital in
ows would adversely af-
fect nancial stability by triggering asset price booms, imprudent lending,
currency mismatches, etc. It was also felt that when large capital 
ows in-
teracted with the pegged exchange rate regime, this would yield substantial
monetary policy distortions. It was hoped that capital controls would mod-
ify the magnitude and composition of capital 
ows, and thus assist in the
preservation of the exchange rate peg, and help to improve nancial stability.
Over recent decades, many countries have moved towards greater de jure
capital account openness. One measure of de jure capital account restrictions
is the Chinn-Ito measure (Chinn and Ito, 2008).2
Figure 1 superposes the kernel density plot, across countries, of the Chinn-
Ito measure in 1970 as opposed to 2008. In 1970, most countries were fairly
closed. In 2008, there was a bimodal distribution, with many countries being
fairly open.
Table 1 compares India against the `bsst' countries (Brazil, South Africa,
South Korea and Turkey).3 In 2008, South Africa, Turkey and China had the
2Chinn and Ito (2008) codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border nancial
transactions as in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (areaer). The four major categories used are: presence of multiple ex-
change rates, restrictions on current account transactions, capital account transactions
and requirement of surrendering export proceeds. The index for capital account openness
is the rst standardised principal component of these four categories and the share of ve
year window to account for controls on capital transitions.
3These four countries are members of the G-20 with a political and legal system that
are similar to India, and unlike those found in China or Russia. A detailed treatment of
7Figure 1 The density of the Chinn-Ito score





























Table 1 De jure capital account openness: Chinn-Ito measure
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same score as India, while Brazil, South Korea and Russia had liberalised to a
greater extent. In 2007, roughly two-thirds of the countries in the Chinn-Ito
database were more open than India.
2.2 The regulatory framework
The overall system of capital controls involves the activities of the following
agencies: the Ministry of Finance (for portfolio investment), the Ministry
of Industry (for foreign direct investment), the Reserve Bank of India, the
Securities and Exchange Board of India, the Forward Markets Commission,
the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority, and the Pension Fund
Regulatory and Development Authority. The agencies and laws are shown
in Figure 2.
This re
ects the fact that many laws embed capital controls. The Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999, plays a major role in capital controls. But
at the same time, numerous laws have provisions which impose rules upon
the inbound or outbound 
ows of capital. As an example, laws pertaining to
insurance prohibit insurance companies from holding overseas assets.
the rationale of this choice of peers, as opposed to the widely used `bric' set of countries,
is presented in Sinha (2010).
9Figure 3 Investor classes
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Given these large numbers of laws and agencies, there is no unied capital
controls manual. The Reserve Bank of India articulates policy with regard
to capital account transactions through regulations. These are subject to
Parliamentary scrutiny. Beyond this, the Reserve Bank of India and Ministry
of Finance issue notications which are published in the ocial gazette. In
addition, the Reserve Bank of India issues circulars, master circulars and
clarications. If a unied capital controls manual were prepared, it would run
into many thousands of pages. While over $148 billion of foreign capital has
been invested in listed equities alone, so far neither public nor private sources
have created a unied capital controls manual. A recent report produced by
the Ministry of Finance (Sinha, 2010) gives a useful strategic picture of the
overall system of capital controls.
The capital controls feature rules that pertain to each asset class and each
investor class. Dierent rules exist for listed equity, unlisted equity, debt,
derivatives, and foreign direct investment. Individual investors, foreign cor-
porations and non-resident Indians are treated dierently under the law from
broad based funds, charitable trusts or university endowment funds. Figure
3 shows how multiple government agencies (Reserve Bank of India, Securities
and Exchange Board of India, Foreign Investment Promotion Board, Depart-
ment of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Central Board of Direct Taxes) im-
pinge upon various foreign investor classes dened in Indian capital controls
law (Foreign Institutional Investor, Foreign Venture Capital Investment, Non
Resident Indian, others) and their activities on various asset classes (listed
equity, unlisted equity, debt).
10The system of capital controls has imposed signicant transactions costs
upon both inbound and outbound capital 
ows. With this large body of law
created by multiple agencies, the rules are overlapping and sometimes con-
tradictory. Dierent rules for dierent categories of players create problems
of regulatory arbitrage and lack of transparency.
There are concerns about the quality of governance in the administration
of this system of capital controls, with civil servants wielding discretionary
power in a non-transparent setting. Sinha (2010) noted that in the handling
of permissions under Foreign Exchange Management Act by the Reserve
Bank of India, an eective appeals mechanism is lacking. There is no time
limit within which a permission may be granted or denied, and no related
obligation to provide reasons for the denial of a permission. Decisions re-
garding permissions are not published by Reserve Bank of India. Applicants
are provided no clear indication of when permissions would be given.
As an example of the complexity involved, we show some details about the
region where the capital controls regime is the most liberal: listed equities.
 In
ows into listed equity can only come through specied channels.
Foreign corporations, funds or individuals who meet the criteria for
registering as a `Foreign Institutional Investor' (FII), or creating an
`FII sub-account', are required to register with Securities and Exchange
Board of India. Then, they are allowed to invest in the securities of
an Indian company under the Portfolio Investment Scheme, subject
to ceilings of up to 10 percent of the shares of the company for each
Foreign Institutional Investor or sub-account. But:
This cap does not apply if the investor belongs to a dierent
background. If the subaccount belongs to an individual or foreign
corporation (as opposed to a broad based fund, charitable trust
or university fund, endowment, foundation or proprietary fund
of a registered Foreign Institutional Investor), then the limit is 5
percent.
Sinha (2010)
 However, `foreign venture capital funds' are allowed to invest up to
one-third of their funds in specied forms of listed equity:
11Again there is an exception: foreign venture capital funds may
invest in IPOs of venture capital undertaking where the shares
are proposed to be listed, debt or debt instruments of venture
capital undertakings where the foreign VC has already made an
investment by way of equity and preferential allotment of equity
shares of a listed company subject to a lock-in period of one year.
Sinha (2010)
 `Non-resident Indians' are allowed to invest in listed equity. Foreign
Exchange Management Act regulations allow individual investment of
up to 5 percent of the total paid value of shares issued by an Indian
company subject to an aggregate 10 percent cap for all Non Resident
Indians investing in that organisation:
Purchases of equity in certain narrowly dened categories are
prohibited for Non Resident Indians. Non Resident Indians are
prohibited from purchasing shares of chit funds, nidhi companies
or companies involved in agricultural, plantation, real estate or
farm house construction as well as those dealing in Transfer of
Development Rights.
There appear to be other inconsistencies in the law: Foreign Ex-
change Management Act Regulation 5(4) and Schedule 5, Para-
graph 2(1A)(i) and 2(2). Paragraph 2(1A)(i) allows unlimited
Non Resident Indian purchase of the shares of domestic mutual
funds on a repatriation basis. Paragraph 2(2) allows the same on
a non-repatriation basis.
Sinha (2010)
These complexities { in the most open area (listed equities) { demonstrate
that India has a large and complex administrative system of capital controls
with specic rules governing a diverse array of cross-border nance.
We now turn to a chronological narrative of the experience with the use of
capital controls in the setting of macroeconomic policy.
123 A System Under Strain, 1998-2008
3.1 Phase 1: Pegged exchange rate with sterilised in-
tervention
After a brief period of managed 
oating during the initial year of the Asian
crisis, a de facto peg to the USD dollar (i.e., extremely limited 
exibility)
was reestablished on 28 September 1998, under which for the next four years,
until mid 2003, the volatility of the bilateral rupee-dollar rate was reduced
to 1.92 per cent per year.4
As the Asian crisis subsided and the Indian economy emerged out of its down-
turn strong capital in
ows resurged. In this period, the pegged exchange rate
was upheld using sterilised intervention. When foreign assets were purchased,
the rise in reserve money was neutralised by the sale of domestic assets.
This arrangement worked for a period of four-and-a-half years. Expectations
of slow rupee appreciation made the rupee an even more attractive asset than
it already was given the large interest dierentials. In this period India faced
larger capital in
ows as characteristic of countries that implement sterilised
intervention (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999). This then required an increased
pace of intervention. The substitution of domestic assets by foreign assets
in reserve money resulted in a rise in the share of foreign assets in reserve
money.
Figure 4 shows the time-series of the share of foreign exchange reserves in
reserve money through this period. Gradually, the central bank exhausted
its stock of domestic assets. By early 2003, the entire reserve money was
made up of foreign assets. On 16 May 2003, this phase of exchange rate
in
exibility was abandoned and the bilateral volatility of the rupee-dollar
rate was permitted to increase. It rose to 3.9 per cent per annum in the
period mid-2003 to March 2007. The pressure in the foreign exchange market
continued to be high as the combination of high interest dierntials and
expectations of rupee appreciation made the rupee a one way bet (Patnaik,
4Our strategy for measurement of the exchange rate regime draws on the methodology
of Zeileis, Shah, and Patnaik (2010), where structural change econometrics is used to
identify break dates in the exchange rate regression (Frankel and Wei, 1994). The dates of
structural change in the exchange rate regime identied through this methodology are as
follows: A rst period with high in
exibility from 28 Sep 1998 till 16 May 2003, followed
by greater 
exibility till 16 Mar 2007, followed by greater 
exibility. In the main argument
of this paper, this dating is combined with the measured bilateral rupee-dollar volatility
as a measure of exchange rate 
exibility.
13Figure 4 Share of foreign exchange reserves in reserve money in Phase I























3.2 Phase 2: Emphasis on capital controls
Once the stock of bonds with the central bank was exhausted, a new mech-
anism for sterilisation was found. Direct issuance of sterilisation bonds by
the central bank was not feasible owing to provisions in the Reserve Bank of
India Act which forbade bond issuance by the central bank. Hence, head-
room for sterilisation was obtained through a `Market Stabilisation Scheme'
(MSS). Here, the central bank sold bonds as an agent of the Ministry of
Finance, where the proceeds from the sale of bonds were sequestered in a
separate account, and the interest cost of these bonds was shown explicitly
as an on-budget cost.
While MSS was, and is, a feasible strategy for sterilisation, this arrangement
also brought a fresh transparency upon the scal costs of implementing the
exchange rate regime. The exchequer, and ultimately Parliament, weighs
the visible costs of interest payment for MSS bonds against the benets of
exchange rate pegging. This brought a new level of scrutiny upon the actions
of the central bank, transparency which made it more dicult to undertake
sterilisation, especially after the stock (and cost of servicing) the MSS bonds
began to grow rapidly, in a nation with an already heavy scal debt. Perhaps
as a consequence of this, in the following period, the issuance of sterilisation
bonds was constrained and sterilisation was only partial.
14The continued presence of large capital in
ows posed fresh stress upon the
exchange rate regime. In order to uphold the monetary framework, the cen-
tral bank attempted a combination of tightening the large number of levers
available in the capital controls regime. This was an interesting period where
we obtain evidence about the extent to which monetary policy autonomy was
regained through capital controls while maintaining exchange rate policy.
3.3 Examples of capital account restrictions
The Indian capital controls regime oered a very large number of avenues
through which thousands of pages of rules could be used to hinder capital
in
ows. Some examples of the specic mechanisms which were adopted are
as follows:
Hindering foreign borrowing Dollar-denominated borrowing with a ma-
turity below three years has been prohibited under Indian capital con-
trols. In 2004, a capital control was introduced upon this borrowing,
where the interest rate paid by the borrower was capped. For loans of
a maturity between three to ve years, this ceiling was set to 200 basis
points, and for loans of a maturity of above 5 years, this ceiling was set
to 350 basis points.
This capital control would shift the composition of borrowing away from
weaker companies (who are typically smaller) and favour companies
with lower credit risk (who are typically larger). The impact of this
control upon the overall magnitude of dollar denominated borrowing is
less clear.
While there is no explicit cap on the total foreign borrowing that in-
cludes both External Commercial Borrowings (ECBs), i.e dollar bor-
rowings by companies and FII investment in rupee denominated bonds,
the policy framework attempts to control this magnitude. However,
there is a ceiling on FII investment in total rupee denominated bonds,
and within that, on government bonds and corporate bonds.
By 2008, the stock of corporate borrowing under the ECB window (dol-
lar denominated) stood at above USD 62 billion, while foreign lending
to rms in rupee denominated debt was capped by the regulator at
one-tenth of that value, at USD 6 billion. The bias of controls on rupee
denominated versus dollar denominated debt resulted in higher dollar
denominated borrowings by rms.
15Table 2 Stock of dollar denominated corporate borrowing




Hindering venture capital One place where an attempt was made to stop
capital was to prevent in
ows by venture capital/private equity funds.
As a rst step, tax pass-through (to avoid double taxation) for all
venture capital was restricted to nine sectors: poultry, dairy, nanotech-
nology, biofuels, hotels and hospitality, seed research, etc. This rule
change impacted not just upon foreign venture capital / private equity
funds, but domestic venture capital / private equity funds also.
Even if a foreign investor was willing to be double-taxed, there were
problems:
Until recently, the Reserve Bank of India had not approved For-
eign Venture Capital Investment (FVCI) registrations for quite
some time and conditioned the receipt of benets (such as those
dened under investment guidelines) allowed to FVCIs to invest-
ments in 10 sectors; the 9 sectors listed in the IT Act with dairy
and poultry listed as separate sectors by the Reserve Bank of
India.
Sinha (2010)
The Reserve Bank of India restricted Foreign Venture Capital registra-
tion through their control over the ability of the foreign investors to
open bank accounts. Foreign Exchange Management Act regulations
authorise the creation of specic types of bank accounts for foreign res-
idents (both Non-Resident Indians and persons resident outside India).
Each Foreign Venture Capital Fund is required to open two new bank
accounts. This requires Reserve Bank of India permission. Permis-
sions granted by the Reserve Bank of India appear to have been tied
to requirements such as investment in only the nine sectors mentioned
for tax-pass through treatment in the Income Tax Act. This extension
of tax policy was not in keeping with regulations under the Foreign
Exchange Management Act.
Securities and Exchange Board of India registration The Securities and
Exchange Board of India did not register investment managers as For-
eign Institutional Investors even if they otherwise met rules for regis-
16tration, if the investment manager was owned or substantially owned
by Non Resident Indians. There is no explicit provision in Securities
and Exchange Board of India regulations on this (Sinha, 2010).
Automatic route In certain situations, India had placed foreign invest-
ment and foreign borrowing by Indian companies under the External
Commercial Borrowing rules on an \automatic route", whereby Re-
serve Bank of India would automatically approve in
ows that met the
stated criteria. But meetings needed to be held by the Reserve Bank
of India to approve the same. Capital in
ows were prevented by not
holding these meetings for many months.5
Restrictions on oshore derivatives The term `participatory notes' (PNs)
refers to the market for OTC derivatives on Indian underlyings that
trades oshore (Singh, 2007). The book runners on this market are
registered FIIs in India, and they lay o the risk of their overall book
using transactions on the onshore market. These overseas transactions
are outside the jurisdiction of the Indian authorities. In October 2007,
the Indian authorities wrote rules which restricted registered FIIs from
their transactions overseas on this market, in an attempt to reduce
capital in
ows.
End-use restrictions In August 2007, another element of capital controls
was introduced to rein in the in
ow of foreign capital. Use of external
commercial borrowings (ECB) for rupee related expenditure was not
allowed. ECB guidelines also determine what purposes the borrowings
could be used. Like other controls, these restrictions were relaxed in
October 2008. In October 2008, the denition of \infrastructure sec-
tor" was expanded to include power, telecommunication, railways, road
including bridges, sea port and airport, industrial parks, urban infras-
tructure (water supply, sanitation and sewage projects) and mining,
exploration and rening, thereby expanding the scope and use of such
borrowings.
5
Members (of the Ministry of Finance Working Group) discussed investors hav-
ing to apply in writing for approval of investments under the automatic route,
and meetings needing to be held by the Reserve Bank of India to approve the
same. Further, while investments would be routinely approved at meetings,
the Reserve Bank of India, in the past, would often not schedule meetings.
Sinha (2010)
17These examples show how diverse elements of the overall system of capital
controls system were brought into play, in an attempt to regain monetary
policy autonomy which was being undermined by partially sterilised inter-
vention which was being used to achieve goals of currency policy.
4 Did the controls achieve their macroeco-
nomic and nancial stability objectives?
4.1 The questions
We now examine the empirical evidence on the extent to which these goals
were met in three areas: the magnitude of capital 
ows, the defense of the
exchange rate regime, and nancial stability considerations.
However, this analysis is faced with an identication problem: We observe the
treatment (India with a certain strategy for capital controls), and we observe
the outcomes. By itself, this does not identify the eect of the treatment.
Hence, we pursue two approaches. In some cases, it is possible to ask: Did
policy makers achieve the desired goal using the treatment? Answers to such
questions do not constitute a rigorous measure of the treatment eect. For
example, it can always be argued that the treatment had a positive eect,
but other factors overwhelmed these eects and caused the policy failure.
Even so, such analysis contribute to the informal wisdom of economic policy
formulation, since they suggest that the positive eects may not be as large
as hoped. In addition, in some cases, it is possible to compare the Indian
outcome against that of other emerging markets which did not have the
treatment (i.e., whose controls are generally not as restrictive as in India),
which gives some insight on the treatment eect.
4.2 Was India able to hold down the magnitude of cap-
ital in
ows?
Comparison against India's historical experience Did India's elaborate
system of capital controls, accompanied by myriad attempts at using ad-
ministrative controls to retard capital in
ows, ensure that only a modest
scale of capital in
ows took place in the boom of 2003-2007? Figure 5
shows the time-series for annualised capital in
ows. At each quarter,
the sum of the latest four values is shown.


































































(a) Measured in USD (b) Relative to GDP
Expressed in US dollars, capital in
ows increased steadily, from around
10 billion USD a year in the early 2000s to 100 billion USD a year by
early 2008. Although the economy was growing very rapidly during
this period, in
ows were growing even faster; at its peak, capital in
ows
reached 9 per cent of GDP. This was a large scale of capital in
ow by
any standard. If one goal of the Indian capital controls was to prevent
a capital surge, this goal was not achieved.
Given the array of administrative restrictions which were feasible in
the capital controls regime, and were used in this period, the failure to
have a large impact upon capital in
ows appears puzzling and merits
further exploration. As an example, we examine one episode of the
controls closely. On 21 May 2007, faced with diculties in upholding
the exchange rate regime, fresh restrictions upon capital in
ows were
brought in by decreasing these limits for the highest interest rate that
could be paid. There was a 50 basis point reduction for the maturity
from three to ve years: Now companies could only borrow if their cost
of borrowing was lower than 150 basis points. There was a 100 basis
point reduction for the maturity of above ve years: Now companies
could only borrow if their cost of borrowing was lower than 250 basis
points. This constituted a fresh restriction upon capital in
ows: Firms
which were able to borrow below the old ceiling but not above the new
ceiling were barred from undertaking dollar denominated borrowing.
Table 3 compares the quarterly data for capital in
ows for the four
quarters before the capital control was introduced against the four
quarters after. The controls seem to have been eective in arresting
the rapid rise in foreign currency borrowing. But net capital in
ows
19Table 3 Did the capital control of 21 May 2007 matter?
On 21 May 2007, the system of capital controls was used in an attempt to reduce capital
in
ows. For dollar denominated borrowing of maturity between three to ve years, the
maximal interest rate that the Indian borrower was permitted to pay was dropped from
200 to 150 basis points above libor. For borrowing of maturity above ve years, this
ceiling was dropped from 350 to 250 basis points. Firms which were able to borrow below
the old ceiling but not above the new ceiling were thus barred from undertaking dollar
denominated borrowing.
Quarter ended Foreign curr. borr. Other capital in
ows Total
Jun 2006 3,978 6,747 10,725
Sep 2006 1,760 6,100 7,860
Dec 2006 4,049 6,766 10,815
Mar 2007 6,316 9,487 15,830
Jun 2007 6,944 8,754 15,698
Sep 2007 4,217 29,007 33,224
Dec 2007 6,240 23,399 29,639
Mar 2008 5,209 22,815 28,024
of all kinds other than such borrowing grew dramatically in the pe-
riod after the capital control was introduced, soon far surpassing the
amount brought in as registered foreign borrowing. In the end, it does
not appear that the control had much eect on aggregate in
ows.
One year later { on 29 May 2008 { this capital control was rescinded,
since global credit market conditions had changed dramatically. After
the Lehman shock, some of the safest Indian rms were unable to bor-
row at rates of 200 or 350 basis points above LIBOR (for maturities
from three to ve years, and for maturities above ve years, respec-
tively). In October 2008, these ceilings were then shifted to 300 and
500 basis points above LIBOR.
Why did these capital controls fail to make a dierence to the aggregate
volume of 
ows? One example illustrates the responses of economic
agents to the shifting controls. On 7 August 2007, a fresh capital control
was brought in against foreign currency borrowing: Foreign currency
borrowing was restricted to be used for the purpose of importing capital
goods.
Firms seem to have responded to this by buying more imported capital
goods. As Figure 6 shows, the capital control of 7 August 2007 gave a
surge of imports of capital goods. Domestic rms may have substituted
away from domestic capital goods in order to obtain cheap credit. On
20Figure 6 Capital controls that encourage import of capital goods
On 7 August 2007, a fresh capital control was brought in against foreign currency borrow-
ing. Foreign currency borrowing was restricted to be used for the purpose of importing
capital goods. As the graph shows, this gave a surge of imports of capital goods; do-
mestic rms may have substituted away from domestic capital goods in order to obtain
cheap credit. On 23 October 2008, when this end-use restriction was rescinded, imports
of capital goods dropped sharply. The gure below presents the seasonally adjusted levels
























2123 October 2008, when this end-use restriction was rescinded, imports
of capital goods dropped sharply (Figure 6).6 The lower line shows the
time-series of domestic capital goods production.
Another channel for de facto openness of the capital account is trade
misinvoicing. To the extent these channels exists, the ineectiveness
of capital controls is under-stated when measured as the total 
ows on
the capital account.7
Global Financial Integrity has estimated that Indian residents illegally
hold roughly $0.5 trillion outside the country, despite near-comprehensive
restrictions against outbound 
ows until very recently. To the extent
that this estimate is on track, it suggests that the capital controls
regime is relatively ineective.
Comparison against other emerging markets While peak capital in-

ows of 9 per cent of GDP are large by any standard, the counter-
factual question remains: Would this boom have been even bigger if the
capital controls had not been present? In order to shed some light on
this question, we compare India against other emerging markets.
Figure 7 compares annual net capital in
ows in India against Brazil
and against the overall average for emerging and developing countries.
It is hard to argue that India's controls made a signicant dierence, as
the gure shows a bigger capital surge for India when compared with
these peers.
Table 4 compares a group of large emerging markets on the de facto
capital account integration, using the Lane and Milesi-Ferreti database,
where ocial reserves are excluded in order to focus on the behaviour
of the private sector. The gross investment position is dened as a
country's external assets plus liabilities minus reserves as a share of
GDP. This measure is similar to the trade openness measure that adds
exports and imports to measure a country's openness. At the same
time, we exclude central bank reserves held in foreign currencies in
order to capture private assets and liabilities position.
In the Indian case, this gross investment position rose by 43 percentage
points from 2000 to 2007. This value was not much unlike the average
6We estimated an ARIMA model of the seasonally adjusted growth rate of capital goods
imports along with a dummy for the period during which the rupee-related restrictions
were in place, after controlling for the world price of capital goods. The coecient on the
dummy variable is signicant and positive.
7See: Patnaik, Sengupta, and Shah (2009).






India Brazil Emerging and developing economies
Net Capital Inflows




2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(proj.)
Source: IMF, WEO database.
Table 4 De facto integration: the Gross Investment Position (excluding
reserves)
Country Change
1990 2000 2007 1990 to 2000 2000 to 2007
India 30 42 85 12 43
Brazil 40 80 103 40 23
South Africa 52 144 175 92 31
South Korea 34 79 135 45 56
Turkey 35 77 101 42 24
bsst average 40 95 128 55 33
China 38 70 113 32 43
Russia 173 179 { 6
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007)
23Figure 8 Volatility of the INR/USD exchange rate
Each point on the curve is the annualised volatility of the rupee-dollar exchange rate in
a two year (centred) window. In the rst phase, which lasted 4.74 years, rupee volatility
was 1.97 per cent. On 23 May 2003, when the period of full sterilisation ended, volatility
doubled to 3.93 per cent. This lasted for 3.84 years. On 23 March 2007, volatility doubled
again to 8.77 per cent. This third period has lasted 4.03 years.











































4.74 years 3.84 years 4.03 years
of 33 per cent of GDP that is observed for India's peers.
At a minimum, this suggests that the magnitude of capital which came
into India in the 2000-2007 boom was not signicantly unlike that
seen in other large emerging markets, many of which lacked a com-
plex Indian-style capital controls regime.
4.3 Was India able to uphold the exchange rate regime?
By early 2003, the strategy of exchange rate pegging based on full sterilisation
had run its course, as reserve money was entirely formed of foreign exchange
reserves. While the bilateral rupee-dollar volatility had been 1.96 per cent per
year from 28 September 1998 until 16 May 2003, this volatility was allowed
to rise to 3.9 per cent per year when the period of full sterilisation ended.
This modied exchange rate regime once again came under stress with large
capital in
ows. The explicit scal costs, of interest payments on the `market
stabilisation scheme' (MSS) bonds which were issued for the purpose of
sterilisation, were building up. The central bank purchased dollars in order
to uphold the exchange rate regime, but with only partial sterilisation, this
24generated expansionary monetary policy. This monetary policy stance kicked
o the country's largest-ever credit boom. At a time of buoyant business cycle
conditions, monetary policy exacerbated the expansion.
In early 2007, the central bank was buying dollars on a substantial scale.8
As a consequence of the diculties this created, on 23 March 2007, a second
structural break in the exchange rate regime can be seen in the data; the
bilateral rupee-dollar volatility went up to 8.97 per cent per year in the
period following this period up until December 2010. In other words, the
Indian system of capital controls did not deliver the ability to uphold a
pegged exchange rate.
The rst phase { with an annualised rupee-dollar volatility of 1.97 per cent
and full sterilisation { had lasted 4.74 years. The second phase { with an
annualised rupee-dollar volatility of 3.9 per cent, partial sterilisation and
capital controls { had lasted 3.84 years. This third period { of high exchange
rate 
exibility { which continues into the present, has thus far lasted for 4.03
years. It has thus already proved more durable than its predecessor.
4.4 Was India able to achieve nancial stability?
We now turn to the empirical evidence about the extent to which the capital
controls regime delivered on the goals of nancial stability.
However, there is a complexity in the interpretation of this evidence. While
India has a complex capital controls regime, it has certain features which
are inimical to nancial stability. As an example, it favours dollar denomi-
nated borrowing over rupee denominated borrowing. Similarly, it encourages
foreign participation in OTC currency derivatives markets, while blocking
foreign participation in exchange-traded currency derivatives. Thus, by its
very design, the existing capital controls regime is not fully aligned with the
goal of nancial stability. To this extent, the observed outcomes described
ahead are somewhat unsurprising. At the same time, these problems are
a reminder of the diculties of capital controls: it should not be assumed
that a government which brings in capital controls will do so in an error-free
manner.
The credit boom Credit booms are a recurring feature of emerging market
crises that have been linked to capital 
ows. It is hence interesting to
8In February 2007, the central bank purchased $11.86 billion, or 7.8 per cent of reserve
money.
25Figure 9 The credit boom









































ask: Did the Indian capital controls regime defuse a credit boom in the
pre-crisis period?
Figure 9 shows the 25 year time-series of year on year growth of private
credit of banks, termed `non food credit' in India. This shows that
in the post 2005 period, there was an unprecedented credit boom by
historical Indian standards. Year on year credit growth peaked at 39.6
per cent in March 2006. This was a substantial credit boom by any
standard. If one goal of the Indian capital controls was to avoid credit
booms, this goal was not achieved.
International comparison on credit booms While year on year growth
in bank credit of 35.72 per cent, in real terms, is large by any standard,
the counter-factual question remains: Would the credit boom have been
even bigger if the capital controls had not been present? In order to shed
some light on this question, we compare India against other emerging
markets.
Figure 10 suggests that the magnitude of the credit boom which was
triggered o in India in the 2000-2007 expansion was bigger than that
seen in other large emerging markets, many of which lacked a complex
Indian-style capital controls regime.
Currency exposure of rms One argument which can be made in favour
of the Indian-style capital controls is that of avoiding balance sheet
crises when large currency depreciations take place. It is argued that
capital controls which prevent rms from foreign-currency denominated
26Figure 10 The credit boom - in comparison








































Table 5 Exchange rate 
exibility and the currency risk of rms
Period Daily INR/USD Average currency risk
volatility of rms
1 April 1993 to 17 February 1995 0.16 5.899
17 February 1995 to 21 August 1998 0.93 0.540
21 August 1998 to 19 March 2004 0.29 3.753
19 March 2004 to 31 March 2008 0.64 2.066
borrowing are a useful component of policies which encourage nancial
stability. It is hence useful to ask: Did the Indian capital controls regime
ensure that rms were not able to take on unhedged foreign currency
exposure?
A study measuring unhedged currency exposure (Patnaik and Shah,
2010) measures the currency risk of large Indian rms from 1993 to
2008 (pre-crisis). This is an interesting period in that rupee-dollar
volatility changed signicantly across four sub-periods. Table 5 shows
how the exposure of large Indian rms varied across changes in the
exchange rate regime. Exchange rate volatility in these four periods
was low, high, low and high. Unhedged currency risk, of the rms











shows the opposite pattern: high, low, high and low. When exchange
rate 
exibility went up, unhedged currency exposure went down, and
vice versa.
This evidence has two implications for the present discussion. First,
when exchange rate 
exibility in India went down, the capital controls
regime was not able to prevent rms from taking on currency exposure,
despite the presence of restrictive rules governing foreign borrowing. In
addition, this evidence emphasises the moral hazard argument: rms
are likely to reduce their unhedged currency exposure when the ex-
change rate is more 
exible. This emphasises the critical role of the
exchange rate 
exibility, rather than the capital controls regime, as a
tool for achieving nancial stability.
Money market disruption when Lehman failed In September 2008, the
prevailing capital controls regime in India involved severely circum-
scribing banks ability to incur short-term debt and comprehensively
preventing Indian rms from obtaining short-term foreign currency bor-
rowing. The rules in place for rms required a minimum maturity of
foreign borrowing of 3 years, and there was a quantitative restriction on
the overall borrowing by all Indian rms, put together. It is hence in-
teresting to ask: Did the Indian capital controls regime yield a small or
negligible disruption on the Indian money market, after Lehman failed?
Figure 11 shows the 
uctuations of the Indian overnight rate, the \call
money rate", juxtaposed against the two policy rates which are in-
tended to bracket the call money rate. The operating procedure of
monetary policy involves ensuring that the call money rate stays be-
28tween these upper and lower bounds. However, when the Lehman
bankruptcy took place, the operating procedure of monetary policy im-
mediately came under enormous stress, and was unable to prevent the
call money rate from tripling,9 in part because rms that had nanced
themselves abroad suddenly turned to the domestic market when for-
eign lines were cut. This disruption was one of the most sizable in Asia,
a striking result for a country that on most conventional measures is
one of the least nancially integrated of the major emerging markets.
In any case, if one goal of the Indian capital controls was to prevent
global shocks on the money market from transmitting into India, this
goal was not achieved in the Lehman shock.10
Was India able to avoid an asset price boom? Foreign capital 
ows are
often pro-cyclical (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004). In good
times, there are concerns that herding by foreign investors and their use
of momentum strategies interact with an illiquid domestic stock mar-
ket to give very high stock prices. In reverse, the same combination of
factors can yield very low stock prices. One argument which could be
made in favour of capital controls is that of avoiding a boom-and-bust
cycle in asset prices. It is, hence, interesting to ask the question: Did
the Indian capital controls regime deliver a smaller boom-and-bust cycle
in asset prices when compared with other emerging markets which have
greater openness?
Table 6 reports the ratio of the highest value of the stock market in-
dex to the lowest value of the stock market index in the period from
January 2004 and August 2008 (i.e. going up until the Lehman shock).
The countries are ranked by the ratio between the lowest value and
the highest value of the stock market index over this period. The ta-
ble shows that among emerging market countries India had one of the
biggest asset price booms. A striking feature of this table is the more
modest asset price booms in emerging markets with high capital ac-
count openness, such as Chile, Israel and Korea, and the more extreme
asset price booms in relatively closed economies such as China and
India.
9For a more detailed analysis of this episode, see Aziz, Patnaik, and Shah (2008).
10Patnaik and Shah (2009-10) oer evidence that Indian multinationals played an im-
portant part in these events, arguing that multinationals operating global treasuries were
a conduit between global events and domestic money markets. Firms accounting for 56.51
percent of the balance sheet size of Indian companies had outbound FDI; these multina-
tional corporations thus had considerable economic signicance relative to the economy.
29Table 6 Stock price booms (1/2004 to 8/2008)
Rank Country Lowest Highest Ratio
1 Peru 2493.81 23789.75 9.54
2 China 1011.50 6092.06 6.02
3 India 1388.75 6287.85 4.53
4 Indonesia 668.48 2830.26 4.23
5 Brazil 17604.00 73517.00 4.18
6 Russia 6378.83 26196.44 4.11
7 Turkey 15922.44 58231.90 3.66
8 Korea 719.59 2064.85 2.87
9 Argentina 839.93 2351.44 2.80
10 Philippines 1388.15 3873.50 2.79
11 Israel 526.97 1189.04 2.26
12 Chile 7074.51 15618.38 2.21
13 Malaysia 781.05 1516.22 1.94
14 Taiwan 5316.87 9809.88 1.85
5 Current thinking on reforms of India's cap-
ital controls
In the light of the experiences of recent years, including the Great Reces-
sion, how do Indian policy makers envisage the future of the capital controls
regime? In 2010, the report of the Ministry of Finance `Working Group on
Financial Flows' was released, which reviewed the full system of capital con-
trols (other than those prevailing for FDI), and proposed reforms (Sinha,
2010).
This report identies weaknesses of the existing framework of capital controls
on the issues of public administration and governance. It argues that capital
controls should be seen as an integral part of nancial regulation. As a
consequence, all our thinking about good governance, as applied in nancial
regulation, is relevant for capital controls. It states:
30\While regulators should have the freedom to formulate policies spec-
ied in the law, applying policies to individual entities must be con-
sistent, uniform, and transparent.
...
\To the extent that the application of foreign exchange law aects the
ability and extent of individual actors to participate in markets, these
rules are a signicant part of nancial sector regulation. As such,
the best practices and basic principles of rule of law that apply to
other areas of regulation, should apply to these matters as well. To,
for example, meet broad policy objectives through denial of registra-
tion, licenses and other permissions leads to eective discrimination
between similarly placed actors with regard to important economic
opportunities."
Good governance, and the demands of accountability in a democracy, re-
quire a shift away from non-transparent and discretionary power. The key
recommendations of the report are:
1. The operations of capital controls should be rooted in the rule of law.
This means there should be transparency, legal certainty, public release
of reasoned orders, an appeals procedure, etc.
2. The existing capital controls framework, where rules are broken down
both by investor class and by asset class, is proposed to be replaced
by a `qualied foreign investor' framework which will only distinguish
rules pertaining to capital controls by asset class. Alongside this, the
procedures for 'know-your-customer' (KYC) are proposed to be im-
proved, and the information base about foreign investors strengthened
in the spirit of India's membership of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), so as to come up to world standards on checking money laun-
dering and terrorist nancing.
3. An operational mechanism is proposed through which global nancial
rms can sell international products to Indian households (thus cater-
ing to capital out
ows) while setting up regulatory mechanisms for
consumer protection.
4. The restrictions against foreign investment in rupee-denominated debt,
which encourage a disproportionate focus upon dollar denominated bor-
rowing by Indian rms, are sought to be eased.
5. The capital controls favouring foreign participation in OTC currency
derivatives, but blocking foreign participation in exchange-traded cur-
31rency derivatives, are sought to be modied in favour of a capital con-
trols framework that does not disfavour exchange-traded derivatives.
In February 2011, the government took the rst steps on translating these
recommendations into action, with movement on two fronts. First, the quan-
titative restriction on rupee-denominated debt was doubled to $40 billion
with a focus on rupee-denominated debt issued by infrastructure companies.
Second, the rst steps in moving away from the FII framework were be-
gun, by permitting foreigners to invest in Indian mutual funds without going
through the process of FII registration.
6 Conclusions and areas for further work
Capital controls are of interest as a tool of economic policy from two points
of view. On one hand, it is argued that nancial globalisation is inimical to
nancial stability: capital controls are then a method for improving nancial
stability. In addition, many policy thinkers chafe at the constraints imposed
by the impossible trinity. Can a country choose something other than the
three corners? Can a country undertake a modest scale of exchange rate
policy, but preserve monetary policy autonomy through the use of capital
controls?
Do capital controls matter? In the extreme, we can envision a world where
one capital control (e.g. a restriction on ADR arbitrage introduced by India)
has a zero eect because the required trades get done through other channels.
A recent literature (Ma and McCauley, 2008; Levy Yeyati, Schmukler, and
Van Horen, 2009) has emphasised that this is not the case in most emerging
market settings. In the typical emerging markets, capital controls are able to
force wedges between prices, generate failures of market eciency, introduce
distortions, etc. In this sense, capital controls do matter. However, the right
question that needs to be asked is: Do capital controls deliver useful results
in the domain of macroeconomic policy, to compensate for these diculties?
That is the stance taken in this paper.
The Indian experience is not encouraging from this point of view. Capital
controls did not allow the perpetuation of the pegged exchange rate; policy
makers were forced into a 
oating rate when monetary policy distortions built
up and an in
ation crisis was set o. In addition, capital controls did not
improve nancial stability; indeed, in many ways, capital controls worsened
nancial stability.
32In some respects, these results are not surprising. An extensive set of expe-
riences with capital controls from the 1970s and 1980s, which were studied
in the academic literature in the 1990s, suggested that capital controls are
not useful tools of policy. These experiences lay at the foundation of the aca-
demic and practitioner consensus on the question. In the following years, the
strong pace of innovation in computer technology and nance has increased
the mechanisms through which these controls can be bypassed, which would
strengthen the previous consensus. In recent years, the fresh wave of inter-
est in capital controls perhaps re
ects a loss of institutional memory about
the policy experimentation of the 1970s and 1980s. India's experience, from
recent years, is a fresh reminder of the predictive power of the old approach.
6.1 Capital controls as a tool for macroeconomic and
nancial policy
To summarise, this paper questions the extent to which the Indian capital
controls regime can be identied as a useful tool through which the goals
of macroeconomic or nancial policy were achieved. The evidence oered in
this paper suggests that:
1. Despite an unusually restrictive capital controls regime, reinforced by addi-
tional measures during the mid-2000s, the system proved extremely porous:
a) pre-crisis capital in
ows were very large by Indian historical standards;
b) pre-crisis capital in
ows into India were very large by the standards of
emerging markets; there was an unprecedented credit boom.
2. The capital controls regime did not give monetary policy autonomy under
a de facto pegged exchange rate to the US dollar; India evolved away from
this towards greater 
exibility in two stages - rst in May 2003 and then in
March 2007.
3. Despite the controls rms were able to take on or shed currency exposure
from their balance sheets, in response to expectations about exchange rate

exibility.
4. The key ingredient for obtaining low currency risk on the part of the rms
appears to be high exchange rate 
exibility rather than the capital controls.
5. Despite the Indian capital controls regime, when Lehman failed in September
2008, the Indian money market was immediately disrupted; the operating
procedure of monetary policy broke down.
336. Despite the Indian capital controls regime, the boom-and-bust pattern in
stock prices in India was severe by the standards of emerging markets. Many
countries with greater international nancial integration obtained a reduced
asset price boom.
These arguments suggest that the Indian capital controls regime was not
successful in furthering the goals of macroeconomic and nancial policy. In-
deed, the Indian authorities are no longer attempting to implement a pegged
exchange rate while trying to use capital controls to regain monetary policy
autonomy. On the contrary, the exchange rate regime moved away from near-
complete pegging to the dollar as controls failed to prevent rupee volatility
from rising. Further, the Indian authorities have expressed concerns about
the problems of governance, rule of law and microeconomic distortions asso-
ciated with the existing capital controls regime, and have continued with the
process of gradual capital account liberalisation.
6.2 Why did controls fail, and what were the costs of
this policy?
These empirical facts immediately suggest further questions. Why did India's
complex system of capital controls fail to deliver on the goals of macroeco-
nomic and nancial policy?
One element that is visible in the Indian evidence is that even when an
unusually restrictive and detailed system of capital controls is constructed, it
proved highly porous when ex-ante Indian returns were perceived to be high,
and where India was integrating rapidly with the rest of the world. Capital
controls were eective only in changing the windows through which capital
came in.
The precise mechanisms through which capital entered India is an area for
further research that will require exploring the interplay between domestic
nancial development, the rise of Indian multinationals, the mechanisms for
arbitrage given a complex administrative system of controls, the incentive
implications of exchange rate in
exibility for both currency exposures of do-
mestic rms and the magnitude of capital in
ows from foreign investors, and
political economy considerations.
The actions of policy makers appear to have exacerbated the problems. On
one hand, the slowly appreciating exchange rate, where the central bank
was visibly buying dollars every day, gave condence to the private sector
34that the currency was a one-way bet, which further encouraged capital 
ows.
In addition, the focus on the part of the central bank upon the exchange
rate and the tactical battles about trying to block capital in
ows may have
contributed to the loss of focus on the core mandate of monetary policy, on
issues such as in
ation or nancial stability.
6.3 Understanding India's resilience
Diagnosing the sources of resilience of the economy is an important question,
in order to assist the formulation of economic policy strategy in India and
elsewhere. If the capital controls regime was not central to India's relatively
benign experience in the crisis, what were the features of macroeconomic
policy which played a useful role? Many factors played a role, including the
underlying momentum created by the launching of large investment projects
in the years just before the crisis. But in the context of this paper, one
critical policy shift is worth pointing out.
On 23 March 2007, the exchange rate regime moved towards greater 
ex-
ibility, with a bilateral rupee-dollar exchange rate volatility of 9 percent
annualised. In the spirit of the arguments presented about moral hazard
in currency exposure of rms, in response to this increased exchange rate

exibility, rms are likely to have reduced their balance sheet exposure, well
before the global crisis. This timing, of shifting to greater 
exibility well
before the crisis, served India well.
In the crisis itself, the rupee-dollar exchange rate depreciated by 32.8 per
cent over the 1.15 years from 9 January 2008 to 3 March 2009. In many
countries, such a large depreciation could have triggered diculties in rms
having dollar-denominated debt. These rms may have then engaged in
political lobbying to prevent the depreciation, which would in turn require
tight monetary policy. However, in India since this depreciation took place in
the context of a relatively 
exible rate from 26 March 2007 onwards, relatively
few rms experienced negative balance sheet eects.
In other words, if greater exchange rate 
exibility had not come about in
March 2007, there is a possibility that political economy considerations might
have forestalled the large exchange rate depreciation during the crisis. In the
event, the economy was able to benet from this 32.8 per cent increase in
the prices of tradables which helped sustain the economy in the global crisis.
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